largest companies operating in the continent are Canadian, and Canadian companies have invested around $20 billion in African mining projects (Campbell 2011 
Literature Review
Political risk (which, according to many scholars and practitioners, typically includes corruption risk) arises when a company's operations suffer as a result of political changes, instability, or host (or home) government interference with business operations. Scholars have identified two types of political risk; macro and micro (Stapenhurst 1992 , Khattab et al. 2007 , Emel and Huber 2008 . There are various methods that can be used to ascertain risk (Goldstone et al. 2010 ), but many mining companies fail to undertake either political or corruption risk assessments (Rice and Mahmoud 1990 , Dake 1992 , Slovic 1999 , Alon et al. 2006 . This is a significant failing, as it leads such companies being reactive to local stakeholder demands rather than proactive. Assessments of micro-risks have underlined the importance of foreign investment to the local economy, but Polanyi (2001) noted that individuals, groups and communities may also be embedded in social and political relationships and that what is economically valuable may not necessarily be politically or socially viable. Alon and Herbert (2009) suggested that the extent to which a corporation can be viewed as beneficial for the local community depends on three factors: the company's contribution to the local economy, the bargaining power of the firm vis-à-vis the government and the governance structure of the company. Pelizzo (2010) adds that the benefits a corporation provides to a local community may be symbolic or material, objective or perceptive. It is not known if and to what extent Canadian mining companies in Africa are perceived to be beneficial by local communities, but anecdotal evidence suggests that they are not 8 .
Corruption is an important indicator of the performance of a political system (Anderson and Tverdova 2003) . Certain characteristics of host governments have been found to increase the prevalence of corruption related to the mining industry, including the poor quality of democracy (United States Institute of Peace 2010), political instability (Winbourne 2002) , and government decentralization (Goel and Nelson 2011) . The discourse of corruption varies greatly from one country to another since it is dependent on particular historical trajectories and everyday fragments of local culture. Social expectations marking acceptable behavior are not the same; but rather culturally specific and socially produced in the local context.
Corruption is a two-sided transaction with a 'payer' (the supply side of corruption) and a receiver (the demand side). In terms of the supply side, multi-national corporations -usually but not always from advanced countries -pay bribes to public officials (often, but not always in developing countries). On the demand side, the costs of corruption are well documented.
Countries with higher levels of corruption have lower levels of economic growth (Mauro 1995) , less investment (Lambsdorff 2003) and lower levels of inward foreign investment (Wei 2000) , especially from countries with laws against corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra 2016). But as CuervoCazurra (2016) points out, on the supply side, the consensus is less clear. While corruption increases the costs of doing business (Kaufmann 1997 , Svensson 2005 Affairs has re-aligned its development assistance programs to provide support to Canadian companies investing in developing countries to meet these standards (Fantino, 2012) . To meet the increasing demand for good corporate citizenship, a growing number of corporations around the world are practising some form of CSR. However, ongoing tensions between business and social/environmental goals remain. The World Bank found pockets of excellence from which lessons can be drawn, but gaps in company-community engagement at the project-level.
Interestingly, Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) introduces the concept of corporate social irresponsibilitythe notion of corporate managers using corruption to gain a competitive advantage.
Diagram 1 presents our project's theoretical framework. At the core is the relationship between the mining firm in the host country and local stakeholders. The line of inquiry (bold lines) is upstream, to examine how the company assesses micro-political risks, particularly as they relate to corruption issues, and downstream, to examine how this shapes relations with the host government and parliament. The key theories we draw on are shown in the shaded boxes.
For this article, we are presenting the preliminary findings on the how Canadian mining companies undertake corruption risk assessment, and how this informs corporate activity in the host country (i.e. the supply side of corruption) and the actions of host country governments and parliaments, and how these affect the demand side of corruption. 
Data Analysis
Thematic analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994) was used to examine interview and field work data. Transcribed interviews were read to get an overview of the responses. They were reread and first level codes were assigned to data by two researchers independently. These first level codes were then clustered into themes. The data were again reviewed to ensure that the content fit the identified categories. The themes were reworked until two researchers reached agreement and all coded data fit into the identified themes. These constitute the basis for the themes described in the Results section, below.
Then all the qualitative materials and data were reviewed using constant comparison method (Glaser and Strauss 1967) , and the following blocks were produced: 1) Memos that capture similarities and differences in participants' perspectives of corruption; 2) A catalogue of the community projects, CSR practices, ethical codes of Canadian mining companies operating in the African context; 3) An inventory of all metaphors, meanings, rituals and symbols encountered during field work and ethnography. The data obtained from these blocks confirmed the themes identified in the thematic analysis.
Results
Our results to date indicate ten interesting findings and tensions.
The first contradiction and tension is regarding the definition of corruption. The second tension that arose from the data was regarding the costs of corruption. Host country informants tended to describe the costs of corruption in socio-economic and development terms: "Through corruption the state is losing effectiveness, efficiency and resources in general." "Corruption is impacting the economy as a whole", generally consistent with development theorists and practitioners (e.g. Mauro, 1995; Kaufmann & Dininio, 2006) .
By contrast, corporate respondents referred to the additional cost of the bribe itself, plus -and more notably "the time spent by management in attending to investigations, press inquiries or regulatory processes [which] can distract management from the business of developing or operating a mineral property" (L'expert, 2012) and management time spent with corrupt bureaucrats (Kaufmann, 1997 in host countries were reluctant to be interviewed by us 'without permission from headquarters', others were more forthcoming. Reported by one official, the company "bribes frequently", notwithstanding the official company line that "we never bribe". Some corporate officials working in Africa were unfamiliar with the CFPOA.
A fourth tension is recognition of a need to assess corruption risk and actually doing so. The majority of corporate respondents believed that their company had better anti-corruption policy/programs than other companies in the same industry. They strongly agreed that their company emphasized the importance of ethics and social responsibilities in society and that their company rejected offers of bribery. However few companies undertake corruption risk assessment prior to undertaking investment and several are seeking guidance regarding the dilemma they are facing: under Canadian law, it is illegal to bribe foreign officials, but the reality on the ground is that nothing gets done without some sort of bribe. have the resources and knowledge to avoid getting caught." The data suggested that there are differences in the strategies, resources, and discourses of large and small companies; however corruption seemed to be a prevalent problem for both large and small companies.
A sixth tension is the gap between law and practice in host countries. All of the three countries in this study have laws against corruption. In Ghana, for example, the Criminal Code criminalises corruption in the form of active and passive bribery, extortion, wilful exploitation of public office, use of public office for private gain and bribery of foreign public officials. Corruption is illegal and both agent and principal are liable; the nationality of the person who is bribing or being bribed is irrelevant (Business Anti-Corruption Portal-GAN).
The problem on the demand side is not lack of laws, but lack of their implementation. These observations support the findings of Standing and Hilson (2013) that "In Ghana 45% of mineral revenue disseminated to the grassroots is, at some point, 'handled' by traditional authorities and that too often Ghana's chiefs have tended to show a low level of interest in investing the revenues derived from natural resource wealth in their jurisdictions" (page 6).
Furthermore, quoting the CHRAJ report (page 5) they state that: "…Communities impacted by mining activities do not directly benefit from mining royalties. In most cases, most communities did not even know of the existence of the facility [transfer of funds to their chief]. In communities where people expressed knowledge of the facility, they said the chief was the main beneficiary of these funds." (Standing & Hilson, 2013 page 7) .
Local governments and assemblies, with which mining companies also collaborate to obtain 'social license' are no better. In the words of a Member A ninth tension concerns small-scale or artisanal mining. Early commentators, such as the World Bank, saw such mining as "…fertile ground for the growth of indigenous entrepreneurship" (Noetstaller, 1987 , page 16, quoted in Hilson, 2009 ), as creating a social safety net and cash generating alternative for local people in times of economic or environmental stress (Davidson, 1993) , and as providing livelihoods for retrenched civil servants, teachers and others as a result of structural adjustment policies (e.g Banchirigah, 2006; and Chachage, 1995) . In most countries, such mining is illegal (i.e. miners do not have a license to mine) and, in recent years has expanded greatly, with adverse environmental and safety concerns. Our data Finally, a tenth tension relates to the multitude of stakeholders yet a piecemeal approach to the problem. There are, clearly, two sides to corruption, the supply side and the demand side. On the supply side, there are mining companies many of which, in order to be good corporate citizens and not face prosecution under home government laws that make foreign bribery illegal, have adopted compliance regimes and codes of conduct for their employees.
There appears to be a dichotomy between corporate head office officials, who espouse antibribery initiatives, and employees based in host countries who face the day-to-day pressures to bribe to get things done. There is also the home country parliament, which has the responsibility to ensure that anti-bribery laws are implemented. On the demand side, there are host government officials at both the national and local levels and tribal chiefs who demand bribes, host country oversight institutions (including parliaments) which do not adequately ensure that national anticorruption laws are implemented.
Discussion
The findings clearly illustrate that corruption in this context can be characterised as a 'wicked problem' (Head and Alford, 2015; Rittel and Webber, 1973) as there is no definitive formulation or solution, the problems are socially complex and multi-layered with many stakeholders, proposed measures may have unforeseen effects, and there are many interdependencies and multi-causal aspects (Head and Alford, 2015) . As the responsibilities to solve the corruption problem in the mining sector in Africa stretch across multiple organizations and stakeholders, their perspectives and the gaps and contradictions among these perspectives do matter. In this regard, this paper has outlined some of these gaps, issues, and tensions that arose from our field research. These findings clearly demonstrate that any attempts to prevent corruption require radical shifts in attitudes and deep behavioural changes by managers, mining professionals, local administrators, citizens, host government representatives, members of parliament, civil society leaders, and other stakeholder groups.
Findings also indicate that corruption is an ambiguous phenomenon often causing diverse, ambivalent, and contradictory understandings among scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike. Given such ambiguousness, discourses of corruption can only be understood when seen as part of wider social and cultural contexts. The most interesting debates about corruption are those which explore the complex relations between private and public sectors in particular contexts, and those that embed analyses within an appropriate understanding of local political cultures and unique historical contexts.
These ask vital questions about concepts such as transparency, accountability and governance and ask us to analyse what they mean within the socio-political and cultural context in which they were constructed.
Several approaches mention that those involved in corruption deny doing or intending harm. Perpetrators try to avoid the term 'corruption' and disengage their actions from ethical and moral discourses. Part of a strategy to fight corruption for corruption researchers is to emphasize and highlight the moral aspects of corruption and corruption cases. Who is the victim? What is the harm? Identifying the victims and damage gives corruption a face and a voice. We know from social science theories on morality and ethics that victims who can be seen and heard receive more attention. Further research also needs to provide a holistic and multi-layered perspective of corruption dynamics; which can only be achieved through a triangulation of research methods collecting data from diverse stakeholders.
Public Policy and Corporate Implications
Regarding the demand side of corruption, anti-corruption laws are largely unenforced.
This seems to reflect a lack of political will among some key influential bureaucrats and politicians to combat corruption. What is needed is a multi-stakeholder approach, involving governments, parliaments, civil society, the media and business. The host country parliamentcharged with overseeing probity and accountability of government, needs to more effectively oversee public sector activities. As well as strengthened oversight committees -such as Public
Accounts and Finance -parliaments need to ensure that other 'watchdog' institutions -such as supreme audit institutions, ombuds offices, and anti-corruption agencies, are adequately resourced and operate freely, without government interference. They also need to verify that all points of contact through the project cycle (from the granting of licenses, through mining agreements, contracting, procurement and revenue payment) between mining companies and local (including tribal leaders) and national governments are transparent. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is a step in the right direction 10 , but only covers payments from companies to governments -it needs to be more rigorously expanded to cover other parts of the project cycle 11 . Both parliaments and governments need to encourage ethical behaviour by their members and staff, through the establishment of ethics regimes, including codes of conduct, restrictions on the receipt of gifts, declaration of interests (to avoid a conflict of interest) and declaration of assets (for both politicians and senior officials and their close family members), and declaration of interests. Such regimes should operate in a wholly transparent fashion and have sanctions for wrong-doing. In short, public officials need to be encouraged to serve the public, not themselves.
Civil society has important roles to play. As Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) pointed out, governments and parliaments will rarely act with probity, unless citizens demand this of governments and parliaments as a precondition for (re-) election of politicians, who in turn demand this of public servants. The media plays a critical role in reporting incidences of corruption -and following up on actions taken against the miscreants. Here, an access to information law can assist the media carry out its investigative functions, as can the repeal of laws, such as seditious libel, which some governments use to restrict investigative journalism.
On the supply side, the Canadian parliament, government and mining companies can all help reduce corruption. Canada was an early signatory to the OECD Convention Against Corruption, and after a slow start the RCMP are becoming more rigorous in investigating foreign corruption by Canadian companies. Despite recent improvement, moving up the OECD convention enforcement rankings from 9 th in 2012 to 6 th in 2014, more can be done: the Canadian government still lags behind the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland in the implementation of anti-bribery legislation. The government has already beefed up support through Global Affairs' Trade Commissioner Service and Export Development Canada. Further support could be given to Canadian companies to help them better understand and assess corruption risks and avoid demands for bribes, and to host country parliaments to better EITI and other transparency initiatives 12 . The Canadian parliament also has a role to play overseeing the implementation of such policies.
And of course, Canadian mining companies need to take a more pro-active stance against corruption. The incentive for many to develop anti-corruption compliance programs is the threat of investigation by the RCMP. Perhaps a better understanding of why corruption is, in the words of former World Bank President James Wolfensohn, "a cancer" and how it distorts public policy making in host countries, weakens governance and democracy and ultimately impacts adversely on the poor would be an additional incentive to reduce the supply of corruption. Many of the large integrated mining companies already have relatively sophisticated compliance and ethics regimes; these need to be main-streamed within their global operations. Junior companies generally do not have such in-company anti-corruption programs. The outputs of this research project should assist them in developing such programs.
Conclusions
There is a larger agenda of research that can be conducted to shed further light into the dynamics of corruption in the mining sector in Africa: First, further research should develop an integrated framework to link corruption, political risk, corporate anti-corruption programs, including CSR initiatives, and host government accountability through parliamentary oversight.
The hypotheses regarding the links between these variables could be tested; thereby creating an empirical model based on the framework. Second, further research can inquire whether corporate anti-corruption programs and CSR activities are reactive to host country corruption problems and adverse stakeholder reaction, or whether, via ex-ante micro-political risk assessment, such corruption problems can be anticipated and corporate activities, including CSR, can be designed pro-actively and strategically. Third, further research should examine if, and to what extent, the host governments (both executives and legislatures) take into account corruption problems associated with foreign direct investment in the extractive industries at the national and constituency (project site) levels. Fourth, there is a need for further research and guidance for mining companies on how to manage political risks and corruption as well as for the home and host governments and parliaments on how to develop appropriate public policies regarding corruption problems caused by mining operations.
